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Abstract 
Diasporas can play multiple roles in both the host country and the homeland, and diaspora 
activities can varyingly contribute towards peace-building processes or perpetuate conflict 
back home. In this article, we wish to reflect upon the current discussions in this field while 
considering the heterogeneity between and within diaspora communities as well as the 
generational dynamics of diaspora activism. We discuss intra-diaspora group relations as 
potential avenues of conflict and peace-building that transcend the nation-states’ borders, and 
how the dynamics of peace-building and conflict perpetuation can transform over time and 
with subsequent generations. We also discuss the role the second generation can play in peace 
and conflict.  
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Introduction  
 
According to the United Nations, around 3.5 % of the world population currently live outside 
their countries of birth. The number of long-term international migrants is estimated at 272 
million (United Nations, 2019). Whereas reasons for migration vary greatly, a sizeable 
proportion of migrants leave their homelands behind due to the lack of human and 
environmental security and of social justice, fleeing violent conflict, violation of human rights, 
or yet natural disasters. For instance, in 2015 altogether 60 million people were forcefully 
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displaced due to wars, famine or natural disasters and around 20 million of them were displaced 
across international borders (Safer World, 2016). Growing in volume and intensity, migration 
has become one of the most important forces that are shaping today’s politics in the world, not 
the least evidenced by the so-called refugee crisis in the Middle East and how it has restructured 
the political power relations in the region and beyond. Whereas the global deaths in violent 
conflicts have continued to steadily decrease during last decades (Roser, 2016), the on-going 
conflicts as well as peace-building initiatives are taking new shapes and forms, in part due to 
the increased mobility and long-distance participation of diaspora communities in homeland 
affairs. Under these circumstances, it becomes vital to scrutinize the impact of international 
mobility on peace and conflict in different societies, and the role the diasporas can play in both 
the host country and the homeland. 
Migration literature has long emphasized that migrants’ arrival to the host country does not 
mean that their identity is reset to a “blank slate”: ethnicity and religion, which are the 
touchstones of identity politics, continue to be meaningful to migrants. As their identities travel 
with them, it can be argued that the conflict dynamics back in the homeland, including intra-
ethnic disputes, ethno-national conflicts, civil wars and even massacres, also travel with them. 
However, depending on the host country context, these dynamics can take new shapes and 
forms, and restructure intra-ethnic relations differently from the homeland context (Baser, 
2015; Féron, 2017). Not limited to forced migrants, modern diaspora communities consist of 
students and labor migrants, who also foster a sustained interest and engagement towards their 
homeland while at the same time integrating to the host country. This interest and engagement 
have been shown to extend also to diaspora communities’ subsequent generations (Levitt 
2009), thus raising questions about the role they can play in peace and conflict in their ancestral 
homeland.  
In this article, we wish to reflect upon what role diaspora groups play in fostering peace, but 
also in perpetuating conflict in homeland. While doing that we consider the heterogeneity 
between and within diaspora communities, including the generational dynamics. We also 
discuss diaspora-diaspora relations to better understand the possibilities and challenges 
involved in diasporas’ peace-building efforts in their homelands. In the following pages, we 
first examine the multiple roles diasporas play in peace and conflict and then discuss the triadic 
relationship between the diaspora, homeland and host country. We also find it crucial to look 
beyond those relationships and discuss two understudied aspects that deserve more attention if 
we are to better understand diasporas’ multiple roles in peace and conflict. Firstly, we will 
discuss the diaspora-diaspora group relations as potential avenues of conflict, peace-building 
and conflict transformation, and secondly how the generational dynamics shape diasporas’ 
engagement in peace-building efforts and conflict perpetuation in the long run. 
 
Diasporas as Peacemakers, Peace-Breakers or Something In-Between?  
Diaspora engagement in peace and conflict in their home and host countries has become a 
serious debate matter in academia as well as among the policy-makers during the last years. 
One of the reasons for this has been the 9/11 and its aftermath, which set stage for several 
countries declaring War on Terror. It also opened the Pandora’s box on “homegrown terrorism” 
with migrants considered to represent a potential security threat in their countries of residence, 
and therefore becoming an object of securitization practices (Faist, 2002; Cochrane, 2015: 39; 
Baser, 2017). Diasporas’ non-transparent links with certain groups labeled “terrorist” in the 
home countries have drawn suspicion, and diasporas’ engagement in homeland affairs has been 
suggested to increase the risk of new armed conflicts or prolong the already existing ones 
(Cochrane, 2015: 27). However, considering the action that diasporas engage in as perpetuators 
 3 
of homeland conflicts, Smith (2007: 11) argues that diasporic activities show no predetermined 
patterns in a situation of conflict. 
On the other hand, diasporas’ role as agents of peace that contribute to peace-building and post-
conflict developments in their home countries has also been explored. Brinkerhoff (2011: 120) 
maps the possible positive and negative effects that diasporas’ engagement in conflict societies 
produce. Indeed, she argues that “the ‘complex, contradictory and diffuse ways’ diasporas 
impact on peace and security more broadly need to be accounted for in policies and 
programmes for peace, stability and post-conflict reconstruction and development.” Smith 
(2007: 13) also states that “not all diasporas have the same capacities, opportunities or 
motivation to intervene in conflict and diasporas rarely are monolithic entities in terms of 
interests and objectives”. Therefore, considering the heterogeneity of diasporas and the 
multitude of factors that shape their engagement in both contexts, the role diasporas play as 
mediators in peace-building or yet as conflict perpetuators is far from being clear-cut (Smith 
& Stares, 2007).  
Furthermore, not all diasporas nor their members engage in peace-building and conflict 
mechanisms. For once, there are always certain interests and motivations to engage or 
disengage, and even when engaged, diasporas need to have sufficient capacity and leverage to 
actually have an impact on policy-making mechanisms at home and abroad. These attributes 
are highly affected by a confluence of factors, not the least by diaspora group’s volume, 
political status, integration level, the existing national and international networks, or yet by 
corruption in homeland.2 Furthermore, the political environment that diasporas operate in 
should have a system that is open for diaspora influence. Lastly, conflicts and peace processes 
have their own dynamics that also shape diaspora activism, as exemplified in the Table 1 
below: 
Table 1. Diasporas in Peace and Conflict 
Phases of Peace and Conflict Diaspora Activism 
On-going Conflict Advocacy, lobbying, petitions, campaigning, sending 
financial support to armed groups, joining the army or the 
insurgent group as fighters, extra-territorial voting. 
Peace Processes Spoiling or supporting the process, getting involved as 
third party, facilitating host country’s engagement in peace 
processes in the homeland, taking part in the process as 
negotiators. 
Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
and Development 
Making investments, practicing entrepreneurship, 
participating in return migration, development projects, 
development support, and to assistance to foreign donors. 
Transitional Justice Lobbying for recognition of genocide, and taking part in 
truth commissions, healing, reconciliation and justice-
seeking efforts.  
 
                                               
2 Several empirical case studies show the role diasporas play in peace-building and development (see Horst et 
al., 2010). 
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Hence, diasporas’ engagement in various forms of activities towards the homeland can all have 
both positive or negative impacts. These activities include among others;  
• Direct economic remittances to homeland actors that can either have the impact of 
helping in post-conflict reconstruction and sustaining livelihoods during conflict period 
(e.g. Somalia), and/or to create informal transfer systems that are used to support the 
continuation of conflict (e.g. Kosovo). 
• Activities that have philanthropic aims, and that can support long-term knowledge 
transfer (e.g. Afghanistan) and be used to achieve humanitarian goals (e.g. Haiti), 
and/or humanitarian aid that can be discriminatory (e.g. Somalia) and provide a cover 
for political objectives (e.g. Lebanon). 
• Activities that aim to influence host country attitudes and policies via advocacy work 
and lobbying, and that can influence the international political opinion for the 
protection of human rights (e.g. Croatia) and/or can discourage actors to engage in 
peace negotiations (e.g. Irish diaspora). 
Source: (Brinkerhoff, 2011: 120-123). 
 
As we can see, the form, intensity and impact of diasporas’ engagement to peace and conflict 
is dependent on both the host country and homeland political dynamics, and shaped by the 
stage of the on-going conflict or peace-building in the homeland context. On the other hand, 
there can be considerable differences between diasporas groups’ motivations and means to 
engage in homeland affairs. To better understand how diasporas organise and mobilise towards 
the homeland and what motivates their engagements, diasporas need to be considered as 
transnational non-state actors that operate on a deterritorialised basis.  
This means that besides homeland and host country context, diasporas also formulate action 
and motivations in what scholars have named the transnational space. The concept refers to a 
social space that extends across national borders, and that entails cross-border activities, 
engagements, mobility, social relations and emotional attachments that diaspora groups sustain 
and forge within the host country, towards the homeland as well as towards the same diaspora 
communities settled elsewhere (Bauböck & Faist, 2010). The mobilisation power of diasporas 
stems to a large extent from this transnational space, as diasporas are not confined within the 
borders of any particular nation-state. This is particularly evident concerning the virtual space 
through which diaspora members are informed of political and cultural matters related to the 
homeland, and that they employ to organize across national borders. Adamson and Demetriou 
(2007: 491) approach diasporas as having “the organizational and spatial logics of 
deterritorialized and network-based collective identities”. In that sense, diasporas are non-state 
actors that operate in the transnational space, and whose networks, actions and motivations to 
participate are not limited within one particular nation-state.  
The relationship between diaspora groups and the homeland, whether real or imagined, is one 
of the components in the formation of diasporic identity. The relationship with a homeland is 
not automatically ruptured at the departure, nor does it continue in the same format as in the 
homeland. This is particularly true for ethno-national diaspora groups whose diaspora activism 
towards homeland can be highly politicized and rooted to nationalist aspirations and identity 
politics (Sheffer, 2003). The sustaining of diasporas’ engagements, whether they are political, 
economic, cultural, linguistic or other, can also be to some extent rooted to a collective sense 
of identity and belonging, but it would be reductionist to approach diasporas’ homeland 
engagement merely as an expression of (national) belonging. The sense of diasporic identity 
does not automatically translate into participation in homeland affairs, although it can motivate 
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such engagements. Similarly, engagements with homeland do not necessarily evoke a sense of 
belonging, but can rely on already-existing transnational networks and stem from more general 
philanthropic motivations to provide assistance to conflict areas.  
 
Diasporas’ Multiple Roles in Peace and Conflict: The Triadic Relationship 
Besides the transnational space in which diasporas operate, diaspora activism is also 
conditioned by national contexts and the interactions between both state and non-state actors. 
It has been suggested that there is a triadic relationship among diasporas, the states and 
contexts where such groups reside, and the homeland states and the contexts where they or 
their forbears come from. Diaspora theories have been structured around the multi-faceted 
relationships between these three actors (Vertovec, 1999; Demmers, 2002). Each dimension 
has an impact on diaspora’s outreach and behaviour towards peace and conflict in terms of 
determining the scope of their actions. 
Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004: 1023-1024) argue that states can be categorized based on the 
way they treat long-distance members as transnational nation-states, strategically selective 
states and disinterested and denouncing states. The dynamics of interaction between the two, 
therefore, does not automatically bring about unconditional solidarity. As Cohen (1996) points 
out, diasporas’ relationship towards the homeland government have transformed from being 
“victims” to being “challengers”. Hence, the relationship between the two is more often 
asymmetrical, meaning that one is more dominant than the other depending on the political, 
economic and social situations in the home country, and they can shift in time. Regardless, the 
strength of relations between the homeland and the diaspora is one of the main determinants of 
diasporic mobilisation. 
Home countries exercise active diaspora policies to better tap into the diaspora communities’ 
economic, social and political resources and human capital (Pirkkalainen and Abdile, 2009; 
Horst et al., 2010). For instance, homeland politicians have mobilised to create diaspora 
ministries and to formulate policies towards their over-seas members. Several examples of this 
exist by the Chinese, Mexican, Russian, Indian, Hungarian, Filipino and Haitian diaspora 
groups (Varadarajan, 2010). These have aimed at attracting remittances and foreign investment 
by pursuing a highly determined policy to strengthen diaspora-homeland ties (Østergaard-
Nielsen, 2003:211). There has also been a growing trend of granting diasporas extra-territorial 
voting rights, as they are considered potential voters targeted by transnational election 
campaigns (see Varadajaran, 2010: 15).  
Furthermore, homeland governments have interests in creating relations with their diaspora 
abroad as it gives them power of leverage in policy-making procedures of the host country. 
Diaspora groups might be expected to lobby host country governments for homeland interests 
or the latter might simply assume that diaspora groups build bridges between the two. 
Moreover, as the diaspora can consist of groups with differing ideological, ethnic or religious 
attachments, home states tailor multiple diaspora engagement policies to interact with their 
citizens abroad. Separate from the state-linked groups, certain elites in the home country can 
engage in mobilising different sub-groups in the diaspora community to expand their interests 
and ideologies abroad. In such cases, usually government-friendly diaspora groups are chosen 
to become a tool of soft power and public diplomacy by the governing elite, as in the case of 
the Turkish diaspora (Aydin, 2014). This is also one of the reasons why minority nationalisms 
find an enabling environment abroad to flourish (Eccarius-Kelly, 2008). 
Diasporas can be perceived as an asset, but also as a liability by some home states, as the 
transnational space provides a space for contestation, for instance against authoritarian 
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governments. Home states can then aim to curb undesirable diaspora activism while 
simultaneously promoting the groups that share their political agenda. Indeed, local power 
struggles can also become deterritorialized and have an impact on how different diasporas 
groups are positioned vis-à-vis the home state. Therefore, diaspora activism can take two forms 
in the eyes of the home state: Conflictual and Complementary. Conflictual modes of action can 
include advocacy work, protests, lobbying host country governments, forming governments in 
exile, establishing solidarity with other diaspora and civil society organizations in the host 
country and putting pressure on the home state for policy change on certain issues. 
Complementary actions can be examined within the soft power and public diplomacy 
framework, with diaspora (or sections of it) following the home state agenda to strengthen 
national interests driven images and ideas abroad. These issues surely cause friction not only 
between diasporas and homelands, but also between home and host countries and between rival 
diaspora groups.  
The relationship between the hostland and diaspora is also crucial for diaspora mobilisation 
and engagements towards homeland. As Shain and Barth put it: “The basic nature of the 
hostland regime determines the ability of a diaspora to organise influence; indeed, it determines 
the ability to organise at all” (2003: 463). The opportunity structures, namely institutional and 
political ones, in the hostland are one of the most significant determinants of the level of 
mobilization in the diaspora (Sökefeld, 2006). How much space the host country gives to the 
diaspora to express its own agenda and to what extent diaspora groups can organise their own 
civil society groups, associations or the like, determines the success of diaspora involvement 
both in homeland and host country political affairs. On the other hand, the extent to which the 
host state allows the community to exert an influence affects also the worth of the diaspora as 
a foreign policy asset or liability in the eyes of the homeland (Shain & Barth 2003: 463).  
Therefore, host country approaches towards diaspora activism on its soil can take three forms: 
Enabling, Passive and Hindering. Diaspora are more likely to succeed in having an impact in 
homeland affairs, provided the host country offers an enabling environment for the diaspora to 
mobilize locally and transnationally. For instance, the Kurdish diaspora in Sweden has been 
able to create greater visibility for the poor human rights situation of Kurds in the Middle East, 
via active advocacy work and lobbying the local policy-makers. However, host countries may 
also implement policies that might hinder diaspora activism, as is the case with Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LLTE) that has been able to mobilize diaspora members to the extent 
of having a direct impact on the conflict in Sri Lanka. Listed as a “terrorist organization” by 
the United Nations in 2001, similarly to the PKK (Kurdistan’s Workers’ Party) that was listed 
as a “terrorist organization” by the European Union in 2002, diaspora activism related to these 
organizations has been to varying degrees criminalized and hindered in host countries (Potters, 
2010). In certain cases, the host country might stay apathetic to diaspora movements if they do 
not raise politically sensitive issues or possess enough power for leverage. The attitudes of host 
countries to diaspora activism are prone to change over time, and in no small part affected by 
the diplomatic and other relations between the home and the host country. 
The impact of diaspora activism or of mobilisation is also dependent on the relations between 
the homeland and the host country governments. The relations between the homeland and the 
host country can come under stress if the home country wishes to curb or accelerate diaspora 
formation of a certain group in the host country. In order to play a role in peace-building and 
conflict transformation in the homeland, both home and host states would need to accept 
diasporas as potential actors that have agency. Otherwise, their contributions risk to have no 
real impact on actual processes of democratization and peace-building back home, provided it 
is in the interests of different actors. 
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As this brief overview of the research literature on diasporas’ multiple roles to peace and 
conflict shows, diasporas’ participation in homeland peace-building and conflict perpetuation 
is highly context-dependent. It varies between different diaspora groups and depends on the 
triadic relationship between the diaspora, host country and homeland. In addition to this, we 
wish to highlight two other understudied aspects that affect how peace and conflict dynamics 
play out and how they potentially change over time. The first is the diaspora-diaspora relations 
that we argue to be essential to how diasporas mobilise and formulate their homeland 
engagements. The second one is the generational dynamics, in other words, how peace and 
conflict dynamics can not only be transmitted to subsequent generations but also change shape 
in the process. These two aspects will be discussed next in more detail.  
 
Diaspora-Diaspora Relations: Moving beyond the Triadic Relationship 
While this triadic relationship has received considerable attention from scholars, intra-group 
interactions between diaspora groups are highly understudied. Many scholars and other experts 
have ignored the fact that several different diaspora groups can originate from the same country 
and can reproduce the homeland conflict dynamics in the host country. These conflicts can be 
referred to as “cold conflicts’ (McMahon & Chow-White, 2011), which do not grab the 
attention of media outlets and experts as they are not “hot” enough to be noticed. However, 
transnational spaces can also become platforms for the reproduction of hegemony struggles 
among various actors or for the transmission of structural and cultural violence mechanisms, 
as defined by Galtung (1996). Migration experience will not wash away the legacies of existing 
or past conflicts; the political cleavages and intra-group violence that the homeland conflict 
has produced can linger and be transmitted to the host country context. Homeland conflicts 
inherently spill-over to the transnational space. However, they are not an exact reflection of the 
conflict that one can observe in their home country. Therefore, while we should acknowledge 
the path-dependency that diasporas have towards the homeland’s political frames, tensions 
between rival groups may also be regenerated in different forms in the host country and conflict 
dynamics take on a different shape according to the new environment. Conflicts between two 
groups may reappear not only because of a community’s strong retention of the past, but the 
conflict dynamics may come into being because the unequal power relations or ethnic 
hierarchies are reproduced in the host country context. These imbalanced power relations are 
recreated in different shapes and forms in the host country by a combination of numerous 
factors. New opportunities in the host country include the shifts in symmetries of power 
relations between the two conflicting groups that might pave the way for drastic changes in 
inter-group conflict dynamics and cause a transformation in the density, depth and content of 
the conflicts (see Baser, 2015; Pupcenoks, 2015; Féron, 2017).  
The tensions that are rooted in homeland conflicts might reveal themselves in the host country 
in the form of clashes between rival groups, especially at critical junctures in the homeland 
situation. However, usually the violent interactions receive more visibility. Counter-hegemonic 
struggles and mechanisms of contesting sovereignty may stay subtle but they do not disappear. 
Violent outbreaks not only make contentions become apparent, but they also pave the way for 
stigmatisation of these groups and add to the debates related to migration and integration in 
host states. Either way, this subject requires more scrutiny. If the conflict stays dormant without 
any violent outbreaks, then it stays in the form of a “cold conflict’ (McMahon & Chow-White, 
2011). This may then lead to a “negative peace” or as Galtung (1996) defines, to a situation, 
where there is no direct political violence but there is mistrust between the members of certain 
communities.  
There are various examples of ethnic groups – such as the Tamils and Sinhalese in Canada, 
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Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots in London, Serbs and Croats in Australia – who have 
tried or are still trying to settle their issues in their host countries via protests or civil society 
organizations, in parliaments, or yet in the back streets of migrant-populated districts. Such 
conflict import has been discussed by authors such as Skrbis (1999), who discovered that the 
host country context greatly affects diaspora groups’ repertoires of actions. Danforth (1997) 
has focused on Greek–Macedonian relations and inter-group rivalries in Australia, by 
examining the transnational dimension of “global cultural wars”. Whereas most studies have 
focused to examine how diasporas channel their energy to influence homeland and host country 
policies, dynamics of conflict and peace that can create cleavages or forms of cooperation 
between different diaspora communities have remained largely understudied. Similarly, 
diasporas’ role in homeland peace-building or in the reproduction of homeland conflicts as 
they take place in virtual spaces and via the new media deserves more attention than it currently 
receives. 
 
What about the Second Generation? 
Diasporas are heterogeneous in terms of their members’ social class, education, language, 
religion, political affiliations, cultural habits, and even at times ethnic background. The 
generational aspect adds to this diversity. The focus in peace and conflict studies has long been 
on the first generation, and understandably so. The first-generation’s experiences, cross-border 
contacts and attachments towards homeland differ from those of their children, most often born 
and raised in the host country. The experience of departure, migration or even exile is a lived 
experience for the first generation, whereas for the second generation it is evoked, remembered 
and enunciated in the transnational space they are embedded in. The relationship to (ancestral) 
homeland is evidently different, but not necessarily meaningless when it comes to questions of 
peace and conflict in their parents’ homeland.  
Some scholars have argued that the phenomenon of transnational activities and ties towards 
the homeland mainly concern the members of the first generation (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001), 
whereas their children express fading interest towards their ancestral homeland. However, 
there is also evidence that second-generation members continue to engage transnationally 
(Levitt, 2009; Toivanen, 2014). Furthermore, second generation members, who have been 
more passive and “dormant transnationalists” (see Shain & Barth, 2003) can become activated 
in the aftermath of major political disturbances in their parents’ homeland. One such example 
was witnessed during the Gezi park protests that took place at the Taksim Square, Istanbul in 
May-June 2013. It soon resonated among the diaspora communities settled in Europe, sparking 
demonstrations that included second-generation members in Sweden, the Netherlands, France 
and Germany (Baser 2015). Similar phenomenon has been observed in the context of the Arab 
Spring, where first and second-generation have mobilized in the Arab diasporas and made 
claims to homeland and host governments (Beaugrand & Geisser, 2016). 
Second generation’s diaspora activism can vary from participation in political demonstrations 
to advocating for a homeland-related political cause in the host country to sending economic 
remittances via humanitarian and other venues to taking part in skills and knowledge transfer 
via diaspora knowledge networks and to engaging in actual combat in their parents’ homeland. 
One example of such long-distance participation can be found among the Kurdish diaspora 
movement, when second-generation members mobilised in the aftermath of the siege of the 
Kurdish city, Kobane, in 2014 (Toivanen, 2020 forthcoming). The second generation is 
arguably more familiar with their parents’ host country, speak the majority language as their 
mother tongue, and also have different means and possibilities to participate in transnational 
activities towards their ancestral homeland. They are much more integrated – economically, 
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socially and politically - compared to their parents, which, concerning lobbying for instance, 
makes them have different access mechanisms to the policy-making circles in both contexts.  
Studies have shown that the homeland conflict dynamics are not only transported by the first-
generation member to host countries, but also to some extent perpetuated in the second 
generation (Baser, 2015). Similarly to studies on the first generation, the context is also 
significant in the case of the second-generation mobilisation. Comparing second-generation 
Kurds and Turks in Germany and Sweden, Baser (2015) shows how host country policies, 
attitudes and institutions play a role in the conflict perpetuation from the first to the second 
generation. Second generation’s views on homeland conflicts, means as well as motivations to 
engage in peace-building or conflict perpetuation can also be drastically different from those 
of their parents, and not necessarily even based in diaspora networks. For instance, Hess and 
Korf (2014) show how second-generation Tamils in Switzerland mobilised politically during 
the final battle of the civil war in 2009 in Sri Lanka. The authors discovered that two factors 
played into their mobilisation. The first was the multiple senses of belonging they fostered both 
towards Sri Lanka and Switzerland, and the second was the simultaneous witnessing of the 
suffering of Tamils combined with the perceived lack of interest by Switzerland. They 
concluded that this gave way to a new form of diaspora activism that was located and bound 
to the host country.  
The second generation can also have a different take on homeland conflicts and the existing 
political divisions compared to their parents. The intra and inter-ethnic disputes can give way 
to political unity that transcends ethnic or political divisions between and within the diasporas. 
Toivanen’s study (2020 forthcoming) shows how Kurdish second-generation members referred 
to the geography-based political divisions existing within the Kurdish diaspora community in 
France and Finland that had led the first-generation Kurds to mobilise through different 
political groups. However, the second-generation members felt these “old-world” divisions to 
be of less importance, and emphasised a common identity as “Kurdish”, instead of “Iraqi” or 
“Turkish” Kurdish, for instance. The second generation constructs their identity and belonging 
in relation to both the ancestral homeland and their country of birth, which is also reflected in 
intra- and intergroup relations. Therefore, we argue that it is essential to include a focus on the 
generational dynamics when examining diaspora’s multiple roles in peace and conflict, as it 
opens venues to examine how diasporas’ role in peace-building and conflict perpetuation does 
not remain static, but can transform over time and over subsequent generations. 
 
Conclusion 
In this article, we have shown how diasporas’ activities can varyingly contribute towards 
peace-building processes or perpetuate conflict back home. Therefore, diasporas’ role in 
homeland affairs cannot be approached as either “peace-makers” or “peace-breakers”, since 
diaspora activism, be it economic, political or cultural, can support peace-building processes 
but also feed into intra-ethnic conflicts and disputes back home in a variety of ways. What 
modern-day diasporas share as a common attribute, however, is the fact that they have become 
significant transnational non-state actors that operate on a deterritorialized basis (Bauböck & 
Faist, 2010). Herein lies also their power and potential for organisation and mobilisation.  
Simultaneously, diaspora activism is shaped by the existing relations between the triad of 
homeland, host country and diaspora. In addition to paying attention to this triadic relationship, 
we further argue that two understudied aspects deserve more scholarly attention. In order to 
gain a better understanding of diasporas’ role in homeland peace and conflict, there is a need 
to pay attention to diaspora-diaspora relations and the generational dynamics. This means 
 10 
taking into consideration how inter and intra-ethnic conflicts are reproduced and transmitted in 
diaspora, and at times passed over to subsequent generations, whose members can then have a 
different take such conflicts. On the other hand, diaspora-diaspora relations can also be 
significant in building peace, as intra-ethnic disputes can give way to political unity that over 
time and with subsequent generations transcends ethnic and political divisions. 
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